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Abstract
This paper quanties the welfare di¤erences among a monetary union, exible exchange
rates (economic disintegration) and a monetary plus scal transfer union (higher economic
integration). The vehicle of analysis is a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model con-
sisting of two heterogeneous countries. The model is solved using data from Germany and
Italy. Our solutions imply that a switch to exible exchange rates and independent mone-
tary policies would have negligible welfare implications. A similar result applies when we
add interregional scal tranfers as insurance. By contrast, the addition of scal tranfers
as redistribution has non-trivial implications and these depend crucially on whether such
one-sided transfers trigger moral hazard behavior or not.
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1 Introduction
Most eurozone periphery countries are in a debt crisis and a long lasting recession. This has
profound implications for the whole euro area. Since the crisis erupted in 2008, several options
have been discussed in economic and policy circles regarding the re-design of the European
Union (EU) in general and the eurozone in particular. At one extreme, there is the scenario
of breakdown of the eurozone and a return to national currencies. At the other extreme, there
is the proposal to add a scal union to the existing monetary union.
Although a scal union can mean di¤erent things to di¤erent people, it is widely believed
that an essential element of a scal union is interregional scal transfers.1 Actually, such
transfers have been one of the most debated policies of the EU since the early days of the
European integration process (see e.g. the programs of Structural and Regional Funds as
well as Common Agricultural Policy). Moreover, since the seminal papers by Mundell (1961),
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), it is believed that a single currency should be supported
by a scal transfer scheme to help absorb asymmetric macroeconomic shocks; in other words,
scal tranfsers are believed to be an important condition for a successful currency union (see
e.g. Werning and Farhi (2012) for a recent general equilibrium study). On the other hand, one
cannot deduce that adding just one element of a scal union to a monetary union will always
lead to an improvement; as e.g. Perotti (2001) has shown, a centralized scal transfer policy
can lead to less e¢ cient outcomes if other imperfections are present.
In light of the above, this paper compares and welfare ranks three distinct policy regimes.
First, the case of a monetary union. Second, the case in which the monetary union is replaced
by national currencies and thus independent monetary policies. Third, the case of even higher
economic integration in which the monetary union is enriched by a scal union, where the
latter takes the form of interregional scal transfers.
Regarding interregional scal transfers, by mimicing policy practice in the EU (see the
programs mentioned above) and by following e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1996a and 1996b)
and Fatas (1998), we distinguish two types. Transfers as insurance and transfers as redistribu-
tion. The former are transfers that insure countries against temporary country-specic shocks.
Resources are redistributed from countries facing positive shocks to countries facing adverse
shocks. This is like interregional risk sharing. Such transfers are also known as ex post redis-
tribution in the sense that they are not anticipated. Transfers as redistribution, by contrast,
1Other elements can include scal rules and coordination, a crisis resolution mechanism, a joint guarantee
for government debt and a relatively large federal budget jointly with federal taxes (see e.g. Fuest and Peichl,
2012). See also Bordo et al. (2013) for a scal union within the euroarea and history lessons from other scal
unions in the world economy. Breuss (2011) and De Grauwe (2013) discuss other policy options in the EU.
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redistribute resources systematically from relatively rich to relatively poor member-countries.
Now, resources are redistributed to reduce chronic country disparities in, say, GDP per capita.
They are also known as ex ante redistribution in the sense that they are anticipated.
The vehicle of analysis is a medium-scale New Keynesian world economy DSGE model
consisting of two countries, home and foreign. We dene the home country as Germany and
the foreign country as Italy. The countries are assumed to be identical except for scal policy
and the degree of impatience (this is explained right below). An international asset allows
agents in one country to borrow from, or lend to, agents in the other country. Under a
monetary union, there is a single currency and a single monetary policy, but the two countries
are free to follow independent or national scal policies. We follow a feedback policy rule type
approach to (monetary and scal) policy.
We solve this model numerically. Fiscal policies are set as in the data in the two countries,
Germany and Italy, while their degrees of patience (or their discount factors) are set so as to
match real interest rates in the two countries, where the time period is the euro years since
2001. The rest of parameters are assumed to be the same across countries and are set at
conventional values, subject to a sensitivity analysis. The steady state solution of this model
can mimic relatively well the averages of the key data in the two countries over the euro years.
In other words, although there can be many types of heterogeneity between these two countries,
a model that simply allows for di¤erences in scal policy and the degree of patience can account
for one of the most distinct macroeconomic imbalances during the euro years, namely, current
account decits and hence accumulation of net foreign debt in a periphery country like Italy,
and current account surpluses and hence accumulation of net foreign assets in a center country
like Germany.2 It is worth emphasizing that this particular macroeconomic imbalance, and
the associated conict of national interests, are at the heart of the policy debate in Europe
nowadays (see e.g. Sinn (2010) and Fuest and Peichl (2012)).
In turn, we compare this to the cases of exible exchange rates and a scal (transfer) union.
In the case of exible exchange rates, each country can follow its own Taylor-type independent
monetary policy. In the case of scal union, we add interregional transfers, either as insurance
or as redistribution, to the reference regime of a monetary union.
Our main results are as follows. A switch to national currencies has negligible implications
2See e.g. the EEAG Report on the European Economy (2012 and 2015) and EMU Public Finances (2014)
published by CESifo and the European Commission respectively. Italys net foreign debt position, although
sizeable in absolute terms, is not one of the worst in the euroarea. For instance, Greece, Portugal, Spain,
Ireland and Cyprus, are in a worse position (see e.g. the EEAG Report on the European Economy, 2012).
However, since these countries have received nancial aid from the so-called Troika (EC, ECB and IMF), we
prefer to use Italy as our periphery country.
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quantitatively. Specically, welfare di¤erences between a monetary union (with a single mone-
tary policy) and exible exchange rates (with national monetary policies) are practically zero
in all cases studied. Thus, the merits of exible exchange rates, as a way of allowing for an
extra national policy instrument, are questionable. A similar result emerges in the case of a
scal union with interregional transfers as insurance. Namely, any welfare benets from adding
transfers as insurance are very small. Thus, our results do not provide any strong arguments
for interregional risk-sharing. On the other hand, the addition of interregional scal transfers
as redistribution has non-trivial implications. Such transfers always hurt the donor country
(Germany) as probably expected, while what happens to the recipient country (Italy) depends
on whether these transfers trigger moral hazard e¤ects or not. By the latter, we mean that ex
ante transfers distort the incentives to work and save in the recipient country. If they do not
trigger moral hazard e¤ects, the recipient country benets; actually, in our experiments, the
whole union benets since the benet of the recipient country more than outweighs the loss
of the donor country. But if they do trigger moral hazard e¤ects, even the recipient country
loses. In other words, in the case of transfers as redistribution and with moral hazard prob-
lems, transfers are self-destructive for all member countries, including those at the receiving
end, and the resulting losses appear to be relatively large.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
presents a two-country currency union model. Section 4 discusses the solution methodology.
The solution of the currency union model, using data from Germany and Italy, is in section 5.
Section 6 studies exible exchange rates. Section 7 models a scal (transfer) union. Section 8
closes the paper. Technical details are gathered in an online Appendix http://www.aueb.gr/
users/aphil/files/appendix_to_fiscal_union_paper.pdf.
2 Related literature and how our work di¤ers
Our work is related to several literatures. It is rst related to the literature on currency union
models (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005, 2008), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Coenen et al.
(2008), Forni et al. (2010), Werning and Farhi (2012), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Okano (2013)
and Evers (2015)). Second, it is related to the literature on international interdependence
and strategic cooperation (see e.g. Mendoza and Tesar (2005), Beetsma and Jensen (2005)
and Okano (2013)). Third, it is related to the policy literature on the interaction between
monetary and scal policies (see e.g. Leeper (1991), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005 and
2007), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2008), Leeper et al. (2009), Kirsanova et al. (2009), Malley et
al. (2009) and Philippopoulos et al. (2014)). Fourth, it is related to the literature on scal
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reforms (see e.g. Coenen et al. (2008), Forni et al. (2010), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Cogan et al.
(2013), Bi et al. (2013), Benigno and Romei (2014), Benigno et al. (2014) and Philippopoulos
et al. (2015)), although most of these papers focus on debt consolidation. Finally, it is related
to the recent literature on scal unions and its various elements (see e.g. Werning and Farhi
(2012), Beetsma and Mavromatis (2014), Luque et al. (2014) and Evers (2015)).
Nevertheless, as far as we know, our paper is one of the rst attempts to quantify the
welfare di¤erences among a monetary union, exible exchange rates (economic disintegration)
and a monetary plus scal union (higher economic integration) in a unied dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium setup. We believe that two papers close to ours are Werning and Farhi
(2012) and Evers (2015). As already said, Werning and Farhi (2012) have added transfers as
insurance to a model of a monetary union. Evers (2015) has provided a quantitative assessment
of di¤erent forms of scal federalism within a monetary union model. But our work di¤ers.
For instance, these papers focus on symmetric countries. By contrast, in our model countries
di¤er (one country is a creditor and the other is a borrower) which is as in the eurozone data
and, perhaps more importantly, is at the heart of the policy debate in Europe these days.
Besides, we study scal transfers both as insurance and as redistribution, while most of the
related macroeconomic literature has focused on the former only. Transfers as redistribution
are also at the heart of the policy debate. Finally, we also compare unions (monetary and
scal) to exible exchange rates.
3 A model of a monetary union
This section sets up a New Keynesian DSGE model consisting of two heterogeneous countries
forming a monetary union. To help the reader, we start with an informal description of the
model.
3.1 Informal description of the model and discussion of assumptions
Two countries form a closed system in a New Keynesian setup. In each country, there are
households, rms and a national scal authority or a government. In a currency union regime,
there is a single monetary authority.
Households in each country can save in the form of physical capital, domestic government
bonds and internationally traded assets. The government in each country can sell its bonds
to domestic and foreign households. The latter, namely governments borrowing from abroad,
takes place via the international asset market. In other words, the international asset mar-
ket allows national governments to sell their bonds to foreign private agents and it also allows
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private agents across countries to borrow from, or lend to, each other. We assume that interna-
tional borrowing/lending takes place through a nancial intermediary or bank. This nancial
intermediation requires a transaction, or monitoring, cost proportional to the amount of the
nations debt. This cost creates, in turn, a wedge between the borrowing and the lending inter-
est rate. As a result, when they participate in the international asset market, agents (private
and public) in the debtor country face a higher interest rate than agents (private and public)
in the creditor country.3 Also, when interest rates di¤er, the bank can make a prot and this
prot is rebated lump-sum to agents in the creditor country.
As is well-known, systematic borrowing and lending cannot occur in an homogeneous world.
Some type of heterogeneity is needed. A popular and intuitive way of producing borrowers
and lenders has been to assume that agents di¤er in their patience to consume or, equivalently,
in their discount factors. In particular, the discount factor of lenders is higher than that of
borrowers or, equivalently, borrowers are more impatient than lenders.4 It is also well-known
that such di¤erences in discount factors have to be combined with an imperfection in the
capital market in order to get a well-dened solution; in our model, as said above, the capital
market imperfection is the transaction, or monitoring, cost of the loan.5
This modelling will imply that, because of di¤erences in discount factors, one country is a
net lender and the other is a net borrower in the international asset market and that interest
rates are higher in the debtor country. Given the current account data over the euro years,
we will think of the lender country as Germany and the debtor country as Italy. In this case,
in equilibrium, the relatively impatient Italians will nance their current account decits by
borrowing funds from the patient Germans who run current account surpluses. This scenario
is also consistent with the literature on the interpretation of current accounts in the sense that
systematic low saving rates and current account decits are believed to reect relatively low
patience.6
3Two things should be clared here. First. instead of using the device of a nancial intermediary or bank,
we could just use transaction costs incurred upon borrowers. We prefer the bank-type modeling because we nd
it to be more intuitive (see also e.g. Curdia and Woodford (2009, 2010) and Benigno et al (2014) although in
a closed economy). Second, here, di¤erences in interest rates across countries are produced by transcation or
monitoring costs incurred by the bank. As is known such di¤erences can be produced in various ways including
the probability of sovereign default (see subsection 3.5 below for further details).
4See also e.g. Benigno et al. (2014). Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also use a general equilibrium model with
two types of agents, creditors and borrowers, who discount the future di¤erently. Moreover, we could enrich
our model so as the discount factors are formed endogenously; see e.g. Becker and Mulligan (1997) and Doepke
and Zilibotti (2008) for an endogenous formation of discount factors depending on income, education, e¤ort,
religion, etc. See also e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Choi et al. (2008) for calibrated models where
the discount factor depends on consumption changes.
5See again Benigno et al. (2014). See also Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) where some nancial market imper-
fections are necessary for getting di¤erences in patience across di¤erent agents. .
6See e.g. Choi et al. (2008).
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On other dimensions, the model is a rather standard New Keynesian currency union model.7
In particular, each country produces an array of di¤erentiated goods and, in both countries,
rms act monopolistically facing Calvo-type nominal xities. Nominal xities can give a real
role to monetary and exchange rate policy, at least in the transition path. In a monetary union
regime, we assume a single monetary policy but independent national scal policies. Policy
(both monetary and scal) is conducted by state-contingent policy rules.
In the home economy, there are N identical households and N rms each one of them
producing a di¤erentiated domestically produced tradable good. Similarly, in the foreign econ-
omy. For simplicity, population in both countries, N and N, is constant over time and the
two countries are of equal size, N = N.
The rest of this section formalizes the above story. We will present the domestic country.
The foreign country will be analogous except otherwise said. A star will denote the counterpart
of a variable or a parameter in the foreign country.
3.2 Households
This subsection presents households in the domestic country. There are N identical households
indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; N .
3.2.1 Consumption bundles
The quantity of each variety h produced at home by domestic rm h and consumed by each
domestic household i is denoted as cHi;t(h). Using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, the composite
of domestic goods consumed by each domestic household i, cHi;t, consists of h varieties and is
given by:8
cHi;t =

NP
h=1
[cHi;t(h)]
 1

 
 1
(1)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced in the domestic country
and  = 1=N is a weight chosen to avoid scale e¤ects in equilibrium.
Similarly, the quantity of each imported variety f produced abroad by foreign rm f and
consumed by each domestic household i is denoted as cFi;t(f). Using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator,
the composite of imported goods consumed by each domestic household i, cFi;t, consists of f
7See Okano (2014) for a review of the related literature dating back to Galí and Monacelli (2005, 2008).
8As in e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), here we work with summations rather than with integrals.
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varieties and is given by:
cFi;t =
"
NP
f=1
[cFi;t(f)]
 1

# 
 1
(2)
In turn, having dened cHi;t and c
F
i;t, domestic household is consumption bundle, ci;t, is:
ci;t =

cHi;t
 
cFi;t
1 
(1  )1  (3)
where  is the degree of preference for domestic goods (if  > 1=2, there is a home bias).
3.2.2 Consumption expenditure, prices and terms of trade
Domestic household is total consumption expenditure is:
Ptci;t = P
H
t c
H
i;t + P
F
t c
F
i;t (4)
where Pt is the consumer price index (CPI), PHt is the price index of home tradables, and P
F
t
is the price index of foreign tradables (expressed in domestic currency).
Each domestic households total expenditure on home goods and foreign goods are respec-
tively:
PHt c
H
i;t =
NP
h=1
PHt (h)c
H
i;t(h) (5)
PFt c
F
i;t =
NP
f=1
PFt (f)c
F
i;t(f) (6)
where PHt (h) is the price of each variety h produced at home and P
F
t (f) is the price of each
variety f produced abroad, both denominated in domestic currency.
We assume that the law of one price holds meaning that each tradable good sells at the same
price at home and abroad. Thus, PFt (f) = StP
H
t (f), where St is the nominal exchange rate
(where an increase in St implies a depreciation) and PHt (f) is the price of variety f produced
abroad denominated in foreign currency. As said above, a star denotes the counterpart of a
variable or a parameter in the rest-of-the world. Note that the terms of trade are dened as
PFt
PHt
(=
StPHt
PHt
), while the real exchange rate is dened as StP

t
Pt
. In a currency union model, we
will exogenously set St  1 at all t.
3.2.3 Households optimization problem
Each domestic household i acts competitively to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility,
V0, dened as:
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V0  E0
1X
t=0
tU (ci;t; ni;t;mi;t; gt) (7)
where ci;t is is consumption bundle as dened above, ni;t is is hours of work, mi;t is is real
money holdings, gt is per capita public spending, 0 <  < 1 is domestic agentsdiscount factor,
and E0 is the rational expectations operator.
For our numerical solutions, the period utility function will be (see also e.g. Galí, 2008):
ui;t (ci;t; ni;t;mi;t; gt) =
c1 i;t
1     n
n1+'i;t
1 + '
+ m
m1 i;t
1   + g
g1 t
1   (8)
where n; m; g; , ', ;  are standard preference parameters. Thus, 1= is the elasticity of
substitution between consumption at two points in time and ' is the inverse of Frisch labour
elasticity.
The period budget constraint of household i written in real terms is:
(1 +  ct)

PHt
Pt
cHi;t +
PFt
Pt
cFi;t

+
PHt
Pt
xi;t + bi;t +mi;t +
StP

t
Pt
fhi;t =
=

1  kt

rkt
PHt
Pt
ki;t 1 + e!i;t+ (1  nt )wtni;t +Rt 1Pt 1Pt bi;t 1 +
+
Pt 1
Pt
mi;t 1 +Qt 1
StP

t
Pt
P t 1
P t
fhi;t 1    li;t + i;t (9)
where xi;t is is domestic investment, bi;t is the real value of is end-of-period domestic gov-
ernment bonds, mi;t is is end-of period real domestic money holdings, fhi;t is the real value of
is end-of-period internationally traded assets denominated in foreign currency (if fhi;t < 0, it
denotes private foreign debt), rkt denotes the real return to the beginning-of-period domestic
capital, ki;t 1, e!i;t denotes is real dividends received by domestic rms, wt is the real wage
rate, Rt 1  1 denotes the gross nominal return to domestic government bonds between t  1
and t, Qt 1  1 denotes the gross nominal return to international assets between t 1 and t;  li;t
are real lump-sum taxes/transfers to each household, i;t is prots distributed in a lump-sum
fashion to the domestic household by the nancial intermediary (see below) in a lump-sum
fashion and 0   ct ; kt ; nt  1 are the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labour
income respectively. Note that small letters denote real values, namely, mi;t  Mi;tPt ; bi;t 
Bi;t
Pt
;
fhi;t 
Fhi;t
P t
; wt  WtPt ; e!i;t  e
i;tPt ;  li;t  T li;tPt , where capital letters denote nominal values.
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The law of motion of physical capital for each household i is:
ki;t = (1  )ki;t 1 + xi;t   
2

ki;t
ki;t 1
  1
2
ki;t 1 (10)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital and   0 is a parameter capturing
adjustment costs related to physical capital.
Further details on the households problem, its rst-order conditions and implications for
the price bundles are in Appendix 1.
3.3 Firms
This subsection presents rms in the domestic economy. There are N domestic rms indexed
by h = 1; 2; :::; N . Each rm h produces a di¤erentiated tradable good of variety h under
monopolistic competition and Calvo-type nominal xities.
3.3.1 Demand for rms product
The demand for each domestic rm hs product, yHt (h), is (see Appendix 2 for details):
yHt (h) =

PHt (h)
PHt
 
yHt (11)
where yHt is total product in the domestic country.
3.3.2 Firms optimization problem
Nominal prots of each domestic rm h are dened as:
e
t(h)  PHt (h)yHt (h)  rkt PHt (h)kt 1(h) Wtnt(h) (12)
where kt 1(h) and nt(h) denote respectively the current capital and labor inputs chosen by
the rm.
Maximization is subject to the demand function, (11), and the production function:
yHt (h) = At[kt 1(h)]
[nt(h)]
1  (13)
where At is an exogenous stochastic TFP process whose motion is dened below and 0 <  < 1
is a technology parameter.
In addition, following Calvo (1983), rms choose their prices facing a nominal xity. In
particular, in each period, each rm h faces an exogenous probability  of not being able to
10
reset its price. A rm h, which is able to reset its price at time t, chooses its price P#t (h) to
maximize the sum of discounted expected nominal prots for the next k periods in which it
may have to keep its price xed. This objective is given by:
Et
1X
k=0
kt;t+ke
t+k (h) = Et 1X
k=0
kt;t+k
n
P#t (h) y
H
t+k (h) 	t+k
 
yHt+k (h)
o
where t;t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the rm (but, in equilibrium, it equals the
households intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption), yHt+k (h) =

P#t (h)
PHt+k
 
yHt+k
is the demand function in future periods and 	t(:) denotes the minimum nominal cost function
for producing yHt (h) at t so that 	
0
t(:) is the associated nominal marginal cost.
Further details on the rms problem and its rst-order conditions are in Appendix 2.
3.4 Government budget constraint
This subsection presents the government budget constraint in the domestic economy (details
are in Appendix 3). The period budget constraint of the consolidated government sector
expressed in real terms and aggregate quantities is:
bt +
StP t
Pt
fgt +mt = Rt 1
Pt 1
Pt
bt 1 +Qt 1
StP t
Pt
P t 1
P t
fgt 1 +
Pt 1
Pt
mt 1+
+
PHt
Pt
gt    ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )  kt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt 1 + e!i;t)  nt wtnt    lt (14)
where bt is the end-of-period domestic real public debt, f
g
t is the end-of-period foreign real
public debt expressed in foreign prices andmt is the end-of-period stock of real money balances.
Note that we use the denitions cHt 
PN
i=1 c
H
i;t, c
F
t 
PN
i=1 c
F
i;t, kt 1 
PN
i=1 ki;t 1, e
t PN
i=1
e
i;t, nt  PNi=1 ni;t, F ht 1  PNi=1 F hi;t 1, Bt 1  PNi=1Bi;t 1 and T lt  PNi=1 T li;t. As
said above, small letters denote real variables, namely, bt  BtPt , mt  MtPt and f
g
t  F
g
t
P t
.
Also, the government allocates its total expenditure among product varieties h by solving an
identical problem with household i, so that gt (h) =
h
PHt (h)
PHt
i 
gt.
If we dene total nominal public debt in the domestic country as Dt  Bt + StF gt , so that
in real terms dt  bt + StP

t
Pt
fgt , we have bt  tdt and StP

t
Pt
fgt  (1   t)dt, where 0  t  1
is the fraction of domestic public debt held by domestic private agents and 0  1   t  1 is
the fraction of domestic public debt held by foreign private agents.
In each period, one of the scal instruments ( ct , 
k
t , 
n
t , gt; 
l
t; t, dt) follows residually to
satisfy the government budget constraint. We assume this role is played by the end-of-period
total public debt, dt.
11
3.5 World nancial intermediary
We use a simple and popular model of nancial frictions (see e.g. Uribe and Yue, 2006, Curdia
and Woodford, 2009 and 2010, Benigno et al., 2014). International borrowing, or lending, takes
place through a nancial intermediary or a bank. This bank is located in the home country.
The bank plays a traditional role only, which consists in collecting deposits from lenders and
lending the funds to borrowers.
In particular, the bank raises funds from domestic private agents,
 
fht   fgt

, at the rate Qt
and lends to foreign agents, (fgt  fht ), at the rate Qt .9 In addition, the bank faces operational
costs, which are increasing and convex in the volume of the loan, (fgt  fht ). The prot of the
bank is revenue minus cost where revenue is net of transcation or monitoring costs. Thus, the
prot written in real terms in the domestic country is given by (details are in Appendix 4):
t = Q

t 1
"
Pt 1
Pt
(fgt 1   fht 1) 
PHt
Pt
PHt 1
PHt
 
2
(fgt 1   fht 1)2
#
 Qt 1 St
St 1
Pt 1
Pt
(fgt 1 fht 1) (15)
where  2 (f
g
t 1   fht 1)2 is the real cost function and   0 is a parameter (see subsection 5.1
below for its value). The rst term in the brackets on the RHS is the banks return on the
loan net of monitoring cost, while the last term is payments to the savers.10
The bank chooses the amount of its loan taking Qt and Qt as given. Then, the optimality
condition of the bank with respect to the volume of the loan is (details are again in Appendix
4):
Qt 1 =
Qt 1 StSt 1
1  P
H
t 1
Pt 1
 
2 (f
g
t 1   fht 1)
(16)
where, in a currency union, St  1; thus, Qt > Qt which means that borrowers pay a sovereign
premium.
It needs to be stressed that the implied property in equation (16) - namely, that the interest
rate, at which the country borrows from the rest of the world, is increasing in the nations total
9Recall that fht denotes private foreign assets and f
g
t denotes public foreign debt (i.e. public debt held by
foreign agents) in the home country. Similarly in the foreign country. Thus, if it so happens that
 
fht   fgt

is
positive, it denotes net foreign assets in the home country and if it so happens that (fgt   fht ) is positive, it
denotes net foreign liabilities in the foreign country. In equilibrium, (fg   fh) + StP tPt (fg   fh) = 0.
10Note that, as in Curdia and Woodford (2009 and 2010), any resources consumed by the bank for the
monitoring of its nancial operations are part of the aggregate demand for the Dixit-Stiglitz composite good
(details are in Appendices 2 and 5). Also note that the bank is located in the home country so that its prots
are distributed to private agents in the domestic country in a lump-sum fashion, where t =
PN
i=1 i;t in
equilibrium.
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foreign debt - is supported by a number of empirical studies (see e.g. European Commission,
2012). It should also be stressed that a similar type of endogeneity of the country premium
can be produced by several other models, including models of default risk.11
3.6 Monetary and scal policy
We now specify monetary and scal policy. As said, we follow a rule-like approach to policy.
3.6.1 Single monetary policy under a currency union
If we had exible exchange rates, the exchange rate would be an endogenous variable and the
two countriesnominal interest rates, Rt and Rt , could be free to be set independently by the
national monetary authoritis, say, to follow national Taylor-type rules (see section 6 for exible
exchange rates). Here, by contrast, to mimic the eurozone regime, we assume that only one of
the interest rates, Rt, can follow a Taylor-type rule, while Rt is an endogenous variable replac-
ing the exchange rate which becomes an exogenous policy variable (this modelling, where the
unions central bank uses one of national governmentsinterest rates as its policy instrument,
is similar to that in e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Benigno and Benigno (2008)).12
In particular, we assume a single monetary policy rule of the form:
log

Rt
R

= 

 log

t


+ (1  ) log

t


+
+y

 log

yHt
yH

+ (1  ) log

yHt
yH

(17)
where  and y  0 are respectively feedback monetary policy coe¢ cients on ination and
the output gap and 0 <  < 1 is the weight given to the domestic country relative to the
foreign country (see subsection 5.1 below for the values of these parameters) while variables
without time subscripts denote steady state values.
11Default risk reects the fear of repudiation of debt obligations but also the fear of new wealth taxes with
retroactive e¤ect on debt repayments (see Alesina et al., 1992, for an early study). As Corsetti et al. (2013)
point out, there are two approaches to sovereign default. The rst approach models it as a strategic choice of
the government (see e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, Arellano, 2008, and many others). The second approach
assumes that default occurs when debt exceeds an endogenous scal limit (see Bi, 2012, and many others). Such
issues are beyond the scope of our paper.
12For various ways of modelling monetary policy in a monetary union, see e.g. Dellas and Tavlas (2005) and
Collard and Dellas (2006).
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3.6.2 National scal policies
Countries can follow independent scal policies. As in the case of monetary policy above,
we focus on simple rules meaning that national scal authorities react to a small number of
easily observable macroeconomic indicators. In particular, in each country, we allow the main
spending-tax policy instruments, namely, government spending as share of output, dened as
sgt , and the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labor income, 
c
t , 
k
t and 
n
t , to react
to the public debt-to-output ratio as deviation from a target, as well as to the output gap,
according to the linear rules:13
sgt   sg =  gl (lt 1   l)  gy
 
yHt   yH

(18)
 ct    c = cl (lt 1   l) + cy
 
yHt   yH

(19)
kt   k = kl (lt 1   l) + ky
 
yHt   yH

(20)
nt   n = nl (lt 1   l) + ny
 
yHt   yH

(21)
1where we dene:
lt 
RttDt +Qt
St+1
St
(1  t)Dt
PHt y
H
t
(22)
where ql  0 and qy  0, for q  (g; c; k; n), are respectively feedback scal policy coe¢ cients
on inherited public liabilities and the current output gap (see subsection 5.1 below for their
values) while variables without time subscripts denote steady state values (which, in the case
of scal policy instruments, will be the data averages). Notice that the rest of scal policy
instruments (namely, lump-sum tranfers,  l, and the fraction of public debt held by domestic
agents, ) are set at their data average values all the time.
Fiscal policy in the foreign country is modelled similarly.
13For similar rules, see e.g Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Cantore et al. (2012). See also EMU Public
Finances (2011) published by the European Commission for scal reaction functions used in practice.
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3.7 Exogenous variables and shocks
We now specify the exogenous variables, At; At ;  lt; t;  lt ; 

t and
St+1
St
. We assume that sto-
chasticity comes from shocks to TFP, At and At , only (we report however that our main results
do not depend on this). The rest of the exogenous variables are kept constant over time.
Starting with At and At , we use stochastic AR(1) processes of the form:
log (At) = (1  a) log (A) + a log (At 1) + "t (23)
log (At ) = (1  a) log (A) + a log
 
At 1

+ "t (24)
where 0 < a; a < 1 are persistence parameters, variables without time subscript denote
long-run values and "at  N
 
0; 2a

; "at  N
 
0; 2a

.
The exogenously set scal policy instruments, f lt; t;  lt ; t g1t=0, or equivalently, if we
express lump-sum transfers as share of output, fslt; t; slt ; t g1t=0;14 are assumed to be constant
and equal to their data average values. Finally, as said, in a currency union regime, St  1 at
any t.
3.8 Equilibrium system in a monetary union
We now combine all the above to get the equilibrium system for any feasible policy. The system
is dened to be a sequence of allocations, prices and policies such that: (i) households maximize
utility; (ii) a fraction (1  ) of rms maximize prots by choosing an identical price P#t ; while
a fraction  just set their previous period prices; (iii) the international bank maximizes its
prot (iv) all constraints, including the government budget constraint and the balance of
payments, are satised; (v) all markets clear, including the international asset market; (vi)
policy instruments are set by rules.
The nal equilibrium system is presented in detail in Appendix 5. It consists of 59 equations
in 59 variables, fVt; yHt ,ct, cHt ; cFt ; nt; xt; kt; fht ,mt; TTt; t; Ht ; t;t; wt; mct; e!t; rkt ; dt; t ;
z1t ; z
2
t ; t; qt; Qt; lt; V

t ; y
H
t ; c

t ; c
H
t ; c
F
t ; n

t ; x

t ; k

t ; f
h
t ; m

t ; 
H
t ; 

t ; 

t ; w

t ; mc

t ; e!,
rkt ; dt ; z1t ; z2t ; Qt ; lt ; Rt; s
g
t ; 
c
t ; 
k
t ; 
n
t ; R

t ; s
g
t ; 
c
t ; 
k
t ; 
n
t g1t=0. This is given the
exogenous variables, fAt; At ; slt; t; slt ; t ; St+1St g1t=0, as dened in subsection 3.7, the values of
feedback policy coe¢ cients as dened in subsection (3.6) and initial conditions for the state
variables.
14Thus, slt  
l
t
yHt TT
 1
t
and slt  
l
t
yHt TT
1 
t
.
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4 Solution methodology
Our main goal in this paper is to compare a currency union to alternative policy regimes, like
exible exchange rates and a scal union. We therefore work as follows. First, using commonly
employed parameter values and scal data from Germany and Italy, we numerically solve the
above model of a currency union. This is in the next section (section 5). In turn, to the extent
that the steady state solution of the currency union regime is empirically relevant (meaning
that it can mimic the data averages over the euro area period of study), we will use this regime
as a point of comparison to evaluate the hypothetical regimes of exible exchange rates and a
scal union. This is in sections 6 and 7.
More specically, we solve the two-country model developed above under the three men-
tioned regimes (currency union, exible exchange rates and scal union). In all cases, we
depart from the steady state solution of the currency union model (in other words, the initial
values of the predetermined variables will be those found by the steady state solution of the
currency union model). Then, transition dynamics are driven by extrinsic shocks and changes
in the policy regime (details are provided below as we solve for each regime).
Regarding transition results, we will compute second-order approximate solutions, around
the associated steady state, by following the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a).
In doing so, we use the Dynare toolkit. Note that we focus on second-order approximate
solutions because the model is stochastic and, as is known, rst-order approximations can
give spurious results when used to compare the welfare under alternative policies (see e.g.
the review in Galí, 2008, pp. 110-111). We, nevetheless, report that, in our case, rst-order
approximations give similar results qualitatively (results are available upon request).
Finally, comparisons of alternative policy regimes will be in terms of expected lifetime
discounted utility (or "welfare"). Welfare di¤erences will also be expressed in terms of con-
sumption equivalences, as is the tradition in the related literature (see e.g. Lucas, 1990). As
said, the currency union will serve as the benchmark in these welfare comparisons.
5 Data, parameterization and solution of the monetary union
model
This section solves numerically the model economy of section 3 by using data from Germany
and Italy over 2001-2013. The data are from OECD Statistics and the Eurostat. As we shall
see, the models steady state solution will resemble the main empirical characteristics of the
two countries over the euro years.
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5.1 Parameter values and economic policy
The baseline parameter values and the data averages of scal policy variables are listed in
Tables 1a and 1b respectively. The time unit is meant to be a year. The two countries di¤er in
their discount factors (see  and  in Table 1a) and scal policy (see the scal instruments in
Table 1b). In all other respects, the two countries are assumed to be symmetric. As we shall
see, this is enough to make the solution of the model empirically relevant.
Regarding parameter values, the models key parameters are the discount factors in the
two countries,  and , and the cost coe¢ cient driving the wedge between the borrowing and
the lending interest rate,  . The values of these parameters are calibrated to match the real
interest rates and the net foreign asset position of the two countries in the euro period data. In
particular, the values of  and  follow from the Euler equations in the two countries which,
at the steady state, are reduced to:
Q= = 1 (25)
Q= = 1 (26)
where Q= and Q= are the real interest rates in the two countries.15 Since Q= < Q=
in the data over the euro period, it follows  = 0:9833 >  = 0:9780. That is, the Germans
are more patient than the Italians.
In turn, the optimality condition of the bank, (16), written at the steady state is (as said,
S  1 in a currency union):
Q =
Q
1  PHP  (fg   fh)
(27)
so that, given data from all other variables, we calibrate the value of the parameter  .
All other papameter values, as listed in Table 1a, are the same across countries and are
set at values commonly used in related studies. We report that our main results are robust
to changes in these values. Thus, although our numerical simulations below are not meant to
provide a rigorous quantitative study, they illustrate the qualitative dynamic features of the
model in a robust way.
15Here, t  PtPt 1 and t 
P t
P t 1
(see Appendix 5 for detailed denitions of variables).
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Table 1a: Baseline parameter values
Parameter Home Foreign Description
a; a 0:3 0:3 share of physical capital in production
;  0:5 0:5 home goods bias in consumption
;  3:42 3:42 money demand elasticity
;  0:1 0:1 capital depreciation rate
;  6 6 price elasticity of demand
';' 1 1 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity
;  1 1 elasticity of intertemporal substitution in utility
;  0:2 0:2 price rigidity parameter
m; 

m 0.001 0.001 preference related to real money balances
n; 

n 5 5 preference parameter related to work e¤ort
g; 

g 0.1 0.1 preference parameter related to public spending
;  0.01 0.01 adjustment cost parameter of physical capital
;  0.9833 0.9780 discount factor
 0.072 - cost parameter in international borrowing
;  0.01 0.01 standard deviation of TFP
; 

0.92 0.92 persistence of TFP
Regarding scal (tax-spending) policy instruments in the two countries as dened in sub-
section 3.6.2 above, the steady state tax rates and government spending-to-output ratios are
all set equal to their average values in the data in Germany and Italy (see Table 1b). Along
the transition, scal instruments can also react to the current state of public debt and level of
economic activity as deviations from their steady state values,16 where this reaction is quan-
tied by the feedback policy coe¢ cients in the policy rules (18)-(21). Here, we simply set
the feedback coe¢ cient of government spending on public debt at 0.1 in both countries (i.e.
gl = 
g
l = 0:1) which is necessary for dynamic stability in most experiments, while we switch
o¤ all other scal reactions to debt and output.17 These baseline values of feedback scal
policy coe¢ cients are summarized in Table 1c. We report that our main results are robust to
changes in these values (results are available upon request).
16Since policy instruments react to deviations of macroeconomic indicators from their steady state values,
feedback policy coe¢ cients do not play any role in steady state solutions. Also recall that "money is neutral"
in the long run, so that the monetary and exchange rate policy regimes also do not matter to the real economy
at steady state.
17These values are close to those found by optimized policy rules in related studies (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007) and Philippopoulos et al. (2014). They are also consistent with calibrated or estimated values
by previous research (see e.g. Leeper et al. (2009), Forni et al. (2010), Coenen et al. (2013), Cogan et al.
(2013), Erceg and Linde (2013)).
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Table 1b: Fiscal policy variables (data averages)
Variable Home Foreign Description
 c; c 0.1934 0.1756 consumption tax rate
k; k 0.2041 0.3118 capital income tax rate
n; n 0.3833 0.421 labour income tax rate
sg; sg 0.2131 0.2423 government spending on goods/services as share of GDP
 sl;  sl -0.2039 -0.2163 government transfers as share of GDP
;  0.52 0.61 share of public debt held by domestic agents
Regarding the single monetary policy as dened in subsection 3.6.1 above, we set the
coe¢ cient on ination, , at 1.5 and the coe¢ cient on output, y, at zero.
18 We also set the
weight given to the domestic country in the banks rule, , at the neutral value of 0:5.19 These
baseline values of feedback monetary policy coe¢ cients are also summarized in Table 1c. We
again report that our main results are robust to changes in these values (results are available
upon request).
Table 1c: Baseline feedback policy coe¢ cients
monetary and
scal policy
instruments
monetary
reaction
to ination
and output
home scal
reaction
to debt
and output
foreign scal
reaction
to debt
and output
Rt
 = 1:5
y = 0
sgt s
g
t
gl = 0:1
gy = 0
gl = 0:1
gy = 0
 ct 
c
t
cl = 0
cy = 0
cl = 0
cy = 0
kt 
k
t
kl = 0
ky = 0
kl = 0
ky = 0
nt 
n
t
nl = 0
ny = 0
nl = 0
ny = 0
Notes: In the baseline parameterization,  = 0:5.
18See again previous footnote.
19Our results are not sensitive to this. For instance, we have also set  equal to domestic GDP relative to
union-wide GDP.
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5.2 Solution under a monetary union
The equilibrium system of a currency union was dened in subsection 3.8 and the associated
steady state follows simply if we assume that variables do not change over time (details are in
Appendix 5). Table 2 presents the steady state solution when we use the parameter values and
the policy instruments in Tables 1a-b. At this steady state, the residually determined public
nancing variable is public debt in both countries. Table 2 also presents some key ratios in
the German and Italian data and, as can be seen, the solved ratios are close to their respective
values in the data. In particular, the solution can mimic rather well the data averages of public
debt-to-GDP ratios and foreign debt-to-GDP ratios in the two countries. We also report that
the equilibrium system of a currency union is dynamically stable around its steady state (see
below for transition results under this policy regime).
Table 2: Steady state solution under a monetary union
Variables Description Home Data Foreign Data
u; u utility 0.0376 - 0.0315 -
yH ; yH output 0.3912 - 0.3543 -
c; c consumption 0.2314 - 0.2278 -
n; n hours worked 0.3116 - 0.3063 -
k; k capital 0.6655 - 0.4976 -
w; w real wage rate 0.6976 - 0.7085 -
rk; rk real return to capital 0.1470 - 0.1780 -
Q  Q interest rate premium - - 0.0055 0.0055
c
yHTT 1  ;
c
yHTT 
 1
t
consumption as
share of GDP
0.5633 - 0.6752 -
k
yH
; k

yH capital as share of GDP 1.7009 - 1.4045 -
d
TT  1yH ;
d
TT 1 yH
total public debt
as share of GDP
0.6907 0.6861 1.0871 1.08

(1 )d
TT 1 TT

t f
h

yH
;
(1 )d
TT1    f
h
TT t y
H
total foreign debt
as share of GDP*
-0.2109 -0.2501 0.2114 0.2109
Notes: Parameters and policy variables as in Tables 1a-b.
6 Flexible exchange rates and monetary policy independence
This section resolves the model but now we assume exible exchange rates and hence allow for
independent or national monetary policies, other things equal.
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6.1 Modelling exible exchange rates
In terms of modelling, the only di¤erence from the model in section 3 is that now the exchange
rate between the two countries becomes an endogenous variable. Thus, Rt and St exchange
places. The former was endogenous in section 3, while now it is the latter that becomes
endogenous with the former being free to follow a national Taylor-type rule for the nominal
interest rate. In other words, now we have an independent Taylor-type rule for the national
nominal interest rate in each country:
log

Rt
R

=  log

t


+ y log

yHt
yH

(28)
log

Rt
R

=  log

t


+ y log

yHt
yH

(29)
where , y, 

; 

y  0 are feedback monetary policy coe¢ cients on ination and output in
each country. As before with single policy, we set  = 

 = 1:5 and y = 

y = 0 (we report
that our main results are not sensitive to changes in these feedback policy coe¢ cients).
6.2 Solution under exible exchange rates
The new equilibrium system is as in the case of the currency union except from the change
in the list of endogenous and exogenous variables as described above (further details are in
Appendix 6). Since money is neutral at the steady state, a switch to exible exchange rates
does not a¤ect the steady state solution of real variables and hence the associated level of
utility; they thus remain the same as in Table 2 above. Any di¤erences between the currency
union regime and the exible exchange rate regime will arise in the transition only, during
which monetary and exchange rate policies matter to the real variables thanks to Calvo-type
nominal xities.
Results for expected discounted lifetime utility (or "welfare") in a currency union and under
exible exchange rates are reported in Table 3. This is by using the baseline parameterization.
Numbers in parentheses, below welfare levels, report the associated welfare di¤erence between
the two policy regimes expressed in terms of consumption equivalences (a positive number
means that a switch to exible exchange rates is welfare enhancing vis-a-vis the monetary
union, and vice versa for a negative number).
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Table 3: Expected discounted lifetile utility (welfare) under di¤erent regimes
Regimes Welfare
Germany Italy Union-wide
Monetary union 2.2554 1.4317 1.8439
Independent mon. policies
2:2554
(0)
1:4318
(' 0)
1:8439
(0)
Notes: Union-wide numbers are a weighted sum of country numbers where the weights are
their relative outputs.
Our results in Table 3 imply that the welfare implications of switching to exible exchange
rates are negligible. Specically, welfare di¤erences between a currency union and exible
exchange rates show only at the fourth, or even higher, decimal point, so that the implied con-
sumption equivalences are practically zero. We report that we have experimented with various
changes - in parameter values and the model itself - and this quantitative result continues to
hold. In other words, although one can nd cases where the switch to exible exchange rates
is welfare superior to a monetary union at least for one country (e.g. our results show that
Italy gains relative to the currency union when we assume that extrinsic volatility is much
higher in Italy than in Germany20), or cases where the opposite happens meaning that this
switch is counter-productive (e.g. our results show that Italy loses relative to the currency
union when we assume that it cares strongly about the output gap in its national Taylor rule
for the nominal interest rate), the associated welfare di¤erences continue to be negligible quan-
titatively.21 Actually, since our model abstains from potential credibility problems, typically
arising in the case of independent monetary policy in ination-prone countries like Italy in
the pre-euro period, our ndings cannot provide strong arguments for exible exchange rates
(credibility problems would strengthen even more the arguments for a currency union).22
20For instance, this happens when the standard deviation of the TFP shock is  = 0 in Germany, while it
is  = 0.1 in Italy. In this case, in Italy, welfare is 1.6644 under a curreny union and it rises to 1.6648 only
under exible exchange rates. Germany, by contrast, becomes worse o¤ under exible exchange rates, athough
changes are trivial again.
21Clerc et al. (2009) provide similar evidence when they model the benets from exible exchange rates
vis-a-vis a currency union in the presence of non-synchronized shocks.
22On the other hand, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013) nd larger benets from an exchange rate devaluatiion
although in a model with permanent nominal wage rigidities. Also, Kirsanova et al. (2009) discuss possible
benets from exible exchange rates, when independent monetary policy is used to inate away the real burden
of public debt.
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7 Adding a scal (transfer) union to the monetary union
This section returns to the currency union model of section 3 but now we also add an explicit
transfer mechanism between countries. As argued in the Introduction, a transfer mechanism
is an essential element of a scal union. As also argued in the Introduction, we distinguish two
types of interregional transfers: transfers as insurance and transfers as redistribution. In the
case of tranfers as insurance, temporary tranfers can go in either direction since all countries
can be hit by random, positive or negative, temporary shocks. By contrast, in the case of
transfers as redistribution, the relatively poor country systematically receives a fraction of the
excess of union average output over its domestic output.
We will assume for simplicity that all interregional transfers take place directly between
citizens rather than through their governments (inter-governmental transfers) or through a
common budget (federal tranfers). In all cases, obviously, interregional transfers add up to
zero across countries.
7.1 Modelling transfers
We now model the above two types of transfers. In turn, these transfers will be added to the
model of a monetary union developed in section 3. This will be our scal union model.
7.1.1 Modelling transfers as insurance
We rst consider a transfer mechanism that works as insurance against temporary shocks. In
particular, imagine that the monetary union is at its status quo steady state (see Table 2)
but it can deviate from it temporarily because of random (in our model, TFP) shocks hitting
the two member-countries. These shocks cause deviations of current output (among all other
endogenous variables) from its steady state value in each country. Then, there are transfers
from one country to another conditioned on these temporary deviations in output.
Formally, since Italys output can deviate from its steady state value because of shocks, we
add 
 
yH   yHt
 P Ht
P t
on the revenue side of the households budget constraint in Italy and,
at the same time, we add StP

t
Pt

 
yH   yHt
 P Ht
P t
on the expenditure side of the households
budget constraint in Germany, where  > 0 is a redistributive parameter. Similarly, since
Germanys output can also deviate from its steady state value because of the very same shocks,
we add 
 
yH   yHt
 PHt
Pt
on the revenue side of the households budget constraint in Germany
and, at the same time, we add PtStP t 
 
yH   yHt
 PHt
Pt
on the expenditure side of the households
budget constraint in Italy. Further details and the new equations are in Appendix 7.
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In the numerical solutions, the redistributive parameter,  > 0, is calibrated so as the
average redistributive transfer over time to be (almost) zero. We believe this makes sense: for
transfers to correspond to insurance there should not be a presumption of transfers over time.
With our baseline parameterization, this implies  = 0:05. We report that our qualitative
results are not sensitive to this parameter value.
7.1.2 Modelling transfers as redistribution
We now consider the case where there is a systematic one-way transfer from the relatively rich
to the relatively poor country. The target in the transfer payment scheme is now the average
of output in the two countries. This resembles practice in the EU (see the discussion in the
Introduction).
Formally, the amount paid by Germany (which is the relatively rich country in the status
quo steady state solution of a monetary union) and, at the same time, received by Italy (which
is the relatively poor country in the same solution) is 

yuniont   yHt P
H
t
P t
StP t
Pt

> 0, where
yuniont =
yHt
PH
P
+yHt
PHt
Pt
StP

t
Pt
2 denotes average output in the two countries.
Actually, since now transfers are systematically one-sided from the relatively rich to the
relatively poor country, we will distinguish two sub-cases: one without moral hazard e¤ets and
one with moral hazard e¤ects. By moral hazard, we mean that agents in the recipient country
(Italy) internalize the interregional tranfers and this distorts their individual incentives to save
and work.23 Further details and the new equations are in Appendix 7.
Regarding the redistributive parameter,  > 0, we will use the same value as in the case of
transfers as insurance above (namely,  = 0:05) but we will also report results with di¤erent,
higher values.
7.2 Solution under a monetary plus scal (transfer) union
The new equilibrium system is as in the case of the currency union except from the addition
of transfers and moral hazard e¤ects as described above (details are in Appendix 7). In the
case of transfers as insurance, the steady state solution remains as in Table 2 because shocks
and hence transfers are temporary. In the case of transfers as redistribution, by contrast, the
steady state solution changes because transfers are systematic (see Appendix 7 for the steady
23We could also incorporate moral hazard e¤ects in the case of transfers of insurance. We have chosen not to
do so simply because (we think) it is more natural to study such incentive e¤ects in the context of systematic
transfers.
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state solution in this case).
Here, we report results for excepted discounted lifetime utility only. These results are
shown in Table 4. In this table, for expositional convenience, we also repeat the results for
the other two policy regimes studied above, namely, currency union and exible exchange
rates (see the rst two rows respectively). In the case of transfers as redistribution, as said
above, we distinguish two cases: one without moral hazard e¤ets (see second row from the
end) and one with moral hazard e¤ects (see last row). All this is again with the baseline
parameterization in Tables 1a-c. As said before, numbers in parentheses, below welfare levels,
report the associated welfare di¤erence between a policy regime and the benchmark case of
the monetary union, where the welfare di¤erence is expressed in consumption equivalences.
For instance, a value of  0:045 in the last row means that Germany su¤ers a loss of 4.5% of
consumption. Before we discuss our results, recall that these values are typically small (e.g.
when Lucas, 1990, computes the lifetime welfare gain from a complete elimination of capital
tax rates in the US, he nds a gain of 2.7% of consumption).
Table 4: Expected discounted lifetile utility (welfare) under di¤erent regimes
Regimes Welfare
Germany Italy Union-wide
Monetary union 2.2554 1.4317 1.8439
Independent mon. policies
2:2554
(0)
1:4318
(' 0)
1:8439
(0)
Mon. union plus transfers as insurance
2:2594
(' 0)
1:4324
(' 0)
1:8462
(' 0)
Mon union plus transfers as redistribution
2:1050
( 0:002)
1:7622
(0:007)
1:9337
(0:002)
Mon.union plus transfers as
redistribution (with moral hazard)
 0:4764
( 0:045)
1:2363
( 0:004)
0:3793
( 0:028)
Notes: See notes of Table 3.
Any welfare benets from transfers as insurance appear at the third, or higher, decimal
point only, so that the resulting welfare equivalences are practically zero. Thus, one can hardly
claim that interregional risk-sharing is welfare improving. Recall that transfers as insurance
are two-sided since both countries are hit by shocks. By contrast, the e¤ects of tranfers as
redistribution (see the last two rows) are non trivial. Such onesided transfers hurt the donor
country (Germany) in all cases, while what happens to the recipient country (Italy) depends
on whether these transfers trigger moral hazard side-e¤ects or not. If they do not trigger
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moral hazard side-e¤ects (see the second row from the bottom), the recipient country benets;
actually, the whole currency union benets since the benet of the recipient country more than
outweighs the loss of the donor country. But if they do trigger moral hazard side-e¤ects (see
the bottom row), then even the recipient country loses. In other words, in the case of transfers
as redistribution and with moral hazard problems, transfers are self-destructive for all member
countries including those at the receiving end.
In Appendix 7, we also report sensitivity results with a higher value of the redistributive
parameter, . All qualitative results remain as in Table 4. Quantitatively, a higher  worsens
the detrimental e¤ects of transfers as redistribution in the presence of moral hazard.
8 Summary and possible extensions
This paper studied the implications of di¤erent policy regimes in a New Keynesian DSGE
model consisting of two heterogeneous countries. We compared three debated policy regimes:
a monetary union (used as a benchmark), exible exchange rates and a scal (transfer) union
within the monetary union.
Since the main results have already been listed in the Introduction, we close with some
caveats and possible extensions. Here we studied three policy regimes only and we also modeled
the scal union as a mechanism of interregional scal transfers. But, as also discussed in
the Introduction, a scal union can have additional elements, like eurobonds and a union-
wide bailout mechanism. Besides, there are other interesting policy regimes to study, like a
comparison between a Single Market and a regime with barriers to trade in goods or assets.
We leave such extensions for future research.
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1 Appendix 1: Households
This Appendix presents the solution of the households problem in the domestic country (the
problem of the household in the foreign country is analogous except otherwise said). There
are i = 1; 2; :::; :N identical domestic households who act competitively.
1.1 Households optimality conditions
Each domestic household i maximizes (7)-(8) subject to (1)-(6), (9) and (10) in the main
text. We work in two steps. We rst suppose that the household determines its desired
consumption of composite goods, cHi;t and c
F
i;t, and, in turn, chooses how to distribute its
purchases of individual varieties, cHi;t(h) and c
F
i;t(f). The rst-order conditions of each i include
its constraints, as listed in the main text, plus:
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Equations (1)-(3) are respectively the Euler equations for domestic bonds, foreign assets and
domestic capital, (4) is the optimality condition for money balances and (5) is the optimality
condition for work hours. Finally, (6) shows the optimal allocation between domestic and
foreign goods, while (7) and (8) show the optimal demand for each variety of domestic and
foreign goods respectively.
1.2 Implications for price bundles
Equations (6), (7) and (8), combined with the households budget constraints, imply that the
three price indexes are:
Pt = (P
H
t )
(PFt )
1  (9)
PHt =
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1 
 1
1 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1 
# 1
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where  = 1=N .
2 Appendix 2: Firms
This Appendix presents the solution of the rms problem in the domestic country (the problem
of the rm in the foreign country is analogous except otherwise said). There are h = 1; 2; :::; :N
di¤erentiated domestic rms. Each rm h produces a di¤erentiated good of variety h under
monopolistic competition facing Calvo-type nominal xities.
2.1 Demand for the rms product
Each domestic rm h faces demand for its product, yHt (h). The latter comes from domestic
householdsconsumption and investment, cHt (h) and xt(h), where c
H
t (h) 
PN
i=1 c
H
i;t(h) and
xt(h) 
PN
i=1 xi;t(h); from the domestic government, gt (h), from the nancial intermediary
located in the domestic country, qt(h),1 and from foreign householdsconsumption, cFt (h) 
1See also Curdia and Woodford (2009) for a similar modelling of resources consumed by banks.
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PN
i=1 c
F
i;t (h). Thus, the demand for the Dixit-Stiglitz good produced by each rm h is written
as:
yHt (h) = c
H
t (h) + xt(h) + gt (h) + qt(h) + c
F
t (h) (12)
where, for each component:
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where, using the law of one price discussed above, we have in (17):
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Since, at the economy level, agreggate demand for the domestically produced good is:
yHt = c
H
t + xt + gt + qt + c
F
t (19)
the above equations imply that the demand for each domestic rms product is:
yHt (h) = c
H
t (h) + xt(h) + gt (h) + qt(h) + c
F
t (h) =

PHt (h)
PHt
 
yHt (20)
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2.2 Firms problem
Each domestic rm h maximizes nominal prots, e
t(h):
e
t(h) = PHt (h)yHt (h)  rkt PHt (h)kt 1(h) Wtnt(h) (21)
This is subject to the production function:
yHt (h) = At[kt 1(h)]
[nt(h)]
1  (22)
and, since the rm operates under imperfect competition, the product demand function:
yHt (h) =

PHt (h)
PHt
 
yHt (23)
In addition, following Calvo (1983), rms choose their prices facing a nominal xity. In
each period, rm h faces an exogenous probability  of not being able to reset its price. A rm
h, which is able to reset its price, chooses its price P#t (h) to maximize the sum of discounted
expected nominal prots for the next k periods in which it may have to keep its price xed.
2.3 Firms optimality conditions
To solve the rms problem, we work in two steps. We rst solve a cost minimization problem,
where each rm h minimizes its cost by choosing factor inputs given technology and prices.
The solution will give a minimum nominal cost function, which is a function of factor prices
and output produced by the rm. In turn, given this cost function, each rm, which is able to
reset its price, solves a maximization problem by choosing its price.
The solution to the cost minimization problem gives the input demand functions:
wt = mct(1  a) yt (h)
nt (h)
(24)
PHt
Pt
rkt = mcta
yt (h)
kt 1 (h)
(25)
where mct is real marginal cost.
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Then, the rm chooses its price to maximize nominal prots written as:
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where t;t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the rm, yHt+k (h) =

P#t (h)
PHt+k
 
yHt+k and
	t(:) denotes the minimum nominal cost function for producing yHt (h) at t so that 	
0
t(:) is
the associated marginal cost (namely, 	0t(:) =mctPt).
The rst-order condition gives:
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PHt+k
# 
yHt+k

P#t (h) 

  1	
0
t+k

= 0 (26)
Dividing by the aggregate price index, PHt , we have:
Et
1X
k=0
k[t;t+k
"
P#t (h)
PHt+k
# 
yHt+k
(
P#t (h)
PHt
  
  1mct+k
Pt+k
PHt
)
] = 0 (27)
Therefore, the behaviour of each rm h is summarized by (24), (25) and (27). A recursive
expression of this problem is presented below.
Note that each rm h, which can reset its price in period t; solves an identical problem,
so P#t (h) = P
#
t is independent of h; and each rm h, which cannot reset its price, just sets
its previous period price PHt (h) = P
H
t 1 (h) : Thus, the evolution of the aggregate price level is
given by:  
PHt
1 
= 
 
PHt 1
1 
+ (1  )

P#t
1 
(28)
3 Appendix 3: Government budget constraint
This Appendix presents the government budget constraint in some detail. In the domestic
economy, the government budget constraint in nominal terms is:
Bt +Mt + StF
g
t = Rt 1Bt 1 +Mt 1+
+Qt 1StF
g
t 1 + P
H
t gt    ct(PHt cHt + PFt cFt )  kt (rkt PHt kt 1 + e
t)  ntWtnt   T lt (29)
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Now let Dt  Bt + StF gt denote total nominal public debt. This debt can be held both by
domestic private agents, tDt; where in equilibrium Bt = tDt; and by foreign private agents,
StF
g
t = (1  t)Dt. Then, the government budget constraint can be written as:
Dt +Mt = Rt 1t 1Dt 1 +Mt 1+
+Qt 1 StSt 1 (1  t 1)Dt 1 + PHt gt    ct(PHt cHt + PFt cFt )
 kt (rkt PHt kt 1 + e
t)  ntWtnt   T lt
(30)
and in real terms as:
dt +mt = Rt 1t 1
Pt 1
Pt
dt 1 +
Pt 1
Pt
mt 1+
+Qt 1
StP t
Pt
P t 1
P t
Pt 1
P t 1St 1
(1  t 1) dt 1 + P
H
t
Pt
gt    ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )  kt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt 1 + e!t)  nt wtnt    lt
(31)
Thus, the liabilities of the domestic government as a share of output are:
lt 
RttDt +Qt
St+1
St
(1  t)Dt
PHt y
H
t
(32)
Similarly, the government budget constraint in nominal terms in the foreign country is:
Bt +Mt +
F gt
St
= 
g
2

F gt
P t St
  F gSP 
2
+Rt 1Bt 1 +Mt 1+
+Qt 1
1
St
F gt 1 + P
H
t g

t   ct (P Ht cHt + P Ft cFt )  kt (rkt P Ht kt 1 + e
t )  nt W t nt   T lt
(33)
Let denote Dt to be the total foreign public debt in foreign currency. This can be held by
foreign private agents, Bt = 

tD

t , and by domestic private agents,
F gt
St
= (1  t )Dt . Then,
we have in nominal terms:
Dt +Mt = Rt 1

t 1Dt 1 +Mt 1+
+Qt 1
St 1
St
 
1  t 1

Dt 1 + P Ht gt   ct (P Ht cHt + P Ft cFt )
 kt (rkt P Ht kt 1 + e
t )  nt W t nt   T lt
(34)
Thus, the liabilities of the foreign government as a share of output are:
lt 
Rt

tD

t +Q

t
St
St+1
(1  t )Dt
P Ht yHt
(35)
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4 Appendix 4: Financial intermediary or bank
The prot of the international bank from loans between t  1 and t is distributed at time t. In
nominal terms, this prot is dened as:2
Qt 1

(F gt 1   F ht 1) 
 
2
PHt 1(f
g
t 1   fht 1)2

 Qt 1St

F ht 1   F gt 1

(36)
where the real resources used by the bank are assumed to be consumed at the same time the
interest payments/income are repaid/received, namely at time t; rather then when the loan
contract was originated, namely at time t  1.
Dividing by Pt, the real prot, t, is:
t = Q

t 1
"
Pt 1
Pt
(fgt 1   fht 1) 
PHt
Pt
 
2
PHt 1
PHt
(fgt 1   fht 1)2
#
 Qt 1StP

t
Pt
P t 1
P t

fht 1   fgt 1

(37)
Since, in equilibrium, borrowing equals lending, namely, F gt   F ht = St
 
F ht   F gt

or
fgt  fht = StP

t
Pt
 
fht   fgt

or in turn fgt 1 fht 1 =
St 1P t 1
Pt 1
 
fht 1   fgt 1

, this is rewritten as:
t = Q

t 1
"
Pt 1
Pt
(fgt 1   fht 1) 
PHt
Pt
 
2
PHt 1
PHt
(fgt 1   fht 1)2
#
 Qt 1 St
St 1
Pt 1
Pt
(fgt 1 fht 1) (38)
If the volume of the loan, (fgt 1   fht 1), is chosen optimally, the rst-order condition is:
Qt 1 =
Qt 1 StSt 1
1  P
H
t 1
Pt 1 (f
g
t 1   fht 1)
(39)
Finally, as said, the prot is distributed in lump-sum fashion at the start of period t to
domestic households so that t =
PN
i=1 i;t in equilibrium.
2Thus, at the beginning of period t, agents carry over assets and liabilities from period t 1. Borrowers honor
their preexisting obligations to lenders. In particular, in the international capital market, where transactions
take place via the bank, the bank receives interest income from borrowers and pays o¤ the lenders. The latter
is the interest payments that the bank promised at t   1 to pay at t. The bank also pays the monitoring cost
associated with these transactions.
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5 Appendix 5: Equilibrium in a monetary union
This Appendix presents the equilibrium system in a monetary union, given feedback policy
coe¢ cients. We work in steps.
5.1 Equilibrium equations
The home country is summarized by the following equations:
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
Pt
PHt (1 + 
c
t)
= 
@ut+1
@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
Pt+1
PHt+1
 
1 +  ct+1
Rt Pt
Pt+1
(40)
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
1
(1+ct )
Pt
PHt
StP t
Pt
=
=  @ut+1@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
1
(1+ct+1)
Pt+1
PHt+1
Qt
St+1P t+1
Pt+1
P t
P t+1
(41)
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
1
(1+ct )
n
1 + 

kt
kt 1   1
o
=
= Et
@ut+1
@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
1
(1+ct+1)

(1  )  2

kt+1
kt
  1
2
+ 

kt+1
kt
  1

kt+1
kt
+
 
1  kt+1

rkt+1

(42)
@ut
@mt
=
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
Pt
PHt (1 + 
c
t)
  @ut+1
@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
Pt+1
PHt+1
 
1 +  ct+1
 Pt
Pt+1
(43)
@ut
@nt
= (1  nt )wt
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
Pt
PHt (1 + 
c
t)
(44)
cHt
cFt
=

1  
PFt
PHt
(45)
kt = (1  )kt 1 + xt   
2

kt
kt 1
  1
2
kt 1 (46)
ct =
 
cHt
  
cFt
1 
(1  )1  (47)
wt = mct(1  a)Atkat 1n at (48)
PHt
Pt
rkt = mctaAtk
a 1
t 1 n
1 a
t (49)
e!t = PHt
Pt
yHt  
PHt
Pt
rkt kt 1   wtnt (50)
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1X
k=0
kEt t;t+k
"
P#t
PHt+k
# 
yHt+k
(
P#t
PHt
PHt
Pt
Pt
Pt 1
  
(  1)mct+k
Pt
Pt 1
:::
Pt+k
Pt+k 1
)
= 0 (51)
yHt =
1 ePHt
PHt
 Atkat 1n1 at (52)
bt +mt +
StP t
Pt
fgt =
Rt 1bt 1
t
+ mt 1t +Qt 1
StP t
Pt
P t 1
P t
fgt 1+
+
PHt
Pt
gt    ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )  kt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt 1 + e!t)  nt wtnt    lt (53)
yHt = c
H
t + xt + gt + qt + c
F
t (54)
PHt
Pt
(cHt + xt + gt   yHt ) + P
F
t
Pt
cFt +Qt 1
StP t
Pt
P t 1
P t
 
fgt 1   fht 1

=
=
StP t
Pt
 
fgt   fht

+ t
(55)
 
PHt
1 
=


 
PHt 1
1 
+ (1  )

P#t
1 
(56)
Pt = (P
H
t )
(PFt )
1  (57)
PFt = StP
H
t (58)
P t = (P
H
t )
(PHt =St)
1  (59)
 ePHt   =   ePHt 1  + (1  )P#t   (60)
qt = Q

t 1
 
2
PHt 1
PHt
(fgt 1   fht 1)2 (61)
t = Q

t 1
"
Pt 1
Pt
(fgt 1   fht 1) 
PHt
Pt
 
2
PHt 1
PHt
(fgt 1   fht 1)2
#
 Qt 1 St
St 1
Pt 1
Pt
(fgt 1 fht 1) (62)
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Qt 1 =
Qt 1 StSt 1
1  P
H
t 1
Pt 1 (f
g
t 1   fht 1)
(63)
where t;t+k  k c
 
t+k
c t
Pt
Pt+k
ct
ct+k
, St+1St = 1 in a currency union model and recall that
PHt
Pt
=

PHt
PFt
1 
:
The foreign country is summarized by the following equations:
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
P t
P Ht (1 + ct )
= 
@ut+1
@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
P t+1
P Ht+1
 
1 + ct+1
Rt P tP t+1 (64)
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
P t
P Ht (1+ct )
Pt
StP t
=
= 
@ut+1
@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
P t+1
P Ht+1(1+ct+1)
Qt
Pt+1
St+1P t+1
Pt
Pt+1
(65)
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
1
(1+ct )
n
1 + 

kt
kt 1
  1
o
=
= 
@ut+1
@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
1
(1+ct+1)

(1  )  2

kt+1
kt
  1
2
+ 

kt+1
kt
  1

kt+1
kt
+
 
1  kt+1

rkt+1

(66)
@ut
@mt
=
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
P t
P Ht (1 + ct )
  @u

t+1
@ct+1
@ct+1
@cHt+1
P t+1
P Ht+1
 
1 + ct+1
 P t
P t+1
(67)
 @u

t
@nt
= (1  nt )wt
@ut
@ct
@ct
@cHt
P t
P Ht (1 + ct )
(68)
cHt
cFt
=

1  
P Ft
P Ht
(69)
kt = (1  )kt 1 + xt  

2

kt
kt 1
  1
2
kt 1 (70)
ct =
 
cHt
  
cFt
1 
(1  )1  (71)
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wt = mc

t (1  a)Atka

t 1n
 a
t (72)
P Ht
P t
rkt = mc

ta
Atk
a 1
t 1 n
1 a
t (73)
e!t = P HtP t yHt   P
H
t
P t
rkt k

t 1  
W t
P t
nt (74)
1X
k=0
()k Et t;t+k
"
P #t
P Ht+k
# 
yHt+k
(
P #t
P Ht
P Ht
P t
P t
P t 1
  
(  1)mc

t+k
P t
P t 1
:::
P t+k
P t+k 1
)
= 0 (75)
yHt =
1 ePHt
PHt
 Atkat 1n1 at (76)
bt +mt +
Pt
StP t
fgt = Rt 1bt 1
P t 1
P t
+mt 1
P t 1
P t
+Qt 1
Pt
StP t
Pt 1
Pt
fgt 1+
+
PHt
P t
gt   ct (P Ht cHt + P Ft cFt )  kt (rkt P Ht kt 1 + e!t )  nt wt nt   lt (77)
yHt = c
H
t + x

t + g

t + c
F
t (78)
P Ht
P t
(cHt + xt + gt   yHt ) + P
F
t
P t
cFt +Qt 1
Pt
StP t
Pt 1
Pt
 
fgt 1   fht 1

=
= PtStP t
 
fgt   fht
 (79)
 
P Ht
1 
=


 
P Ht 1
1 
+ (1  )

P #t
1 
(80)
 eP Ht   =   eP Ht 1  + (1  )P #t   (81)
where see below for number of equations and variables in this system.
5.2 Transformed variables
As in the related literature (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005, 2007)), we transform
some variables and introduce some new ones.
First, instead of price levels, we work with ination rates and relative prices. Thus, we dene
t  PtPt 1 ; t 
P t
P t 1
;Ht  P
H
t
PHt 1
; t  P
#
t
PHt
;t 
 ePHt
PHt
 
; t  StSt 1 and TTt 
PFt
PHt
. We also
express some policy variables as shares of output. In particular, we dene bt  sbtyHt TT  1t ,
slt  sltyHt TT  1t and gt  sgt yHt . So, in what follows, we use t; t ; Ht ; t; t; t, TTt; sgt ;
slt instead of Pt; P

t ; P
H
t ; P
#
t ;
ePt; St, PFt ; gt;  lt respectively. Note that we also use (in the
steady state only), fgt  sft yHt 1TT t .
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Second, working as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), we rewrite the rms optimality
conditions in recursive form. In particular, instead of equation (80), we now use:
z1t =

(  1)z
2
t (82)
where
z1t = 
1 
t ytTT
 1
t + Et
c t+1
c t
1 +  ct
1 +  ct+1

t
t+1
1  1
Ht+1
!1 
z1t+1 (83)
z2t = 
 
t ytmct + Et
c t+1
c t
1 +  ct
1 +  ct+1

t
t+1
  1
Ht+1
! 
z2t+1 (84)
thus, we add two more equations and two new endogenous variables, z1t and z
2
t .
Third, again as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), in order to compute expected dis-
counted lifetime utility, denoted as Vt, we add a new equation and a new endogenous variable,
Vt:
Vt =
c1 t
1     n
n1+'t
1 + '
+ m
m1 t
1   + g
 
sgt y
H
t
1 
1   + EtVt+1 (85)
We work similarly for the foreign country. That is, rst, we use Ht ; t ; t ; s
g
t ; s
l
t
instead of P Ht ; P
#
t ;
eP t ; gt; lt respectively, second, we have for the foreign rm:
z1t =

(  1)z
2
t (86)
z1t = 
1 
t y
H
t TT
1 
t + 
Et
c 

t+1
c t
1 + ct
1 + ct+1

t
t+1
1   1
Ht+1
!1 
z1t+1 (87)
z2t = 
 
t y
H
t mc

t + 
Et
c 

t+1
c t
1 + ct
1 + ct+1

t
t+1
   1
Ht+1
! 
z2t+1 (88)
and, thirdly, we have the new value function:
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V t =
c1 

t
1     

n
n1+'

t
1 + '
+ m
m1 

t
1   + 

g
 
sgt yHt
1 
1   + EtV

t+1 (89)
Finally, given the above, notice that we make use of the following equations:
Pt
StP t
= TT 1  

t
TTt =
PFt
PHt
=
PFt
St
PHt
St
=
P Ht
P Ft
P Ht
P t
=
P Ht 
P Ht
  
P Ft
1  = P HtP Ft
1 
= TT 1 

t
P Ft
P t
=
P Ft 
P Ht
  
P Ft
1  = P FtP Ht

=

1
TTt

5.3 Final equilibrium system in a monetary union
Using the above, we now present the nal equilibrium system (given feedback policy coe¢ -
cients).
The domestic country is summarized by the following equations:
Vt =
c1 t
1     n
n1+'t
1 + '
+ m
m1 t
1   + g
 
sgt y
H
t
1 
1   + EtVt+1 (90)
Et
c t+1 
1 +  ct+1
 Rt
t+1
=
c t
(1 +  ct)
(91)
Et
c t+1 
1 +  ct+1
QtTT v+ 1t+1
t+1
=
c t
(1 +  ct)
TT v
+ 1
t (92)
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Et
c t+1
(1+ct+1)
TT  1t+1

1     2

kt+1
kt
  1
2
+ 

kt+1
kt
  1

kt+1
kt
+
 
1  kt+1

rkt+1

=
=
c t
(1+ct )
TT  1t
h
1 + 

kt
kt 1   1
i (93)
mm
 
t =
c t
(1 +  ct)
  Et
c t+1 
1 +  ct+1
 1
t+1
(94)
nn
'
t = (1  nt )wt
c t
(1 +  ct)
(95)
cHt
cFt
=

1   TTt (96)
kt = (1  )kt 1 + xt   
2

kt
kt 1
  1
2
kt 1 (97)
ct =
 
cHt
  
cFt
1 
() (1  )1  (98)
wt = mct(1  a)Atkat 1n at (99)
1
TT 1 vt
rkt = mctaAtk
a 1
t 1 n
1 a
t (100)
e!t = 1
TT 1 vt
yHt  
1
TT 1 vt
rkt kt 1   wtnt (101)
z1t =

(  1)z
2
t (102)
yHt =
1
t
Atk
a
t 1n
1 a
t (103)
dt +mt =
Rt 1
t
t 1dt 1 +
Qt 1TT v+v
 1
t
t
1
TT v+v
 1
t 1
(1  t 1)dt 1+
+ 1tmt 1 + TT
 1
t s
g
t y
H
t    ct( 1TT 1 vt c
H
t + TT
v
t c
F
t ) 
 kt (rkt 1 1TT 1 vt kt 1 + e!t)  nt wtnt   TT  1t sltyHt
(104)
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(1  t)dt   TT + 1t fht + t + TT  1t qt =  TT  1t cFt + TT t cFt +
+
Qt 1TT 
+ 1
t
t

1
TT v+v
 1
t 1
(1  t 1)dt 1   fht 1
 (105)
yHt = c
H
t + xt + s
g
t y
H
t + qt + c
F
t (106)
 
Ht
1 
=  + (1  )  tHt 1  (107)
t
Ht
=

TTt
TTt 1
1 
(108)
TTt
TTt 1
=
t
H
t
Ht
(109)
t
Ht
=

TTt 1
TTt
1 
(110)
t = t 1
 
Ht

+ (1  ) (t)  (111)
z1t = 
1 
t ytTT
 1
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
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 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1 +  ct
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
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 1
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Next, the foreign country is summarized by the following equations:
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()
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
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
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where StF g = (1  t)Dt, F g = (1 t)DtSt ; F
g
P t
= (1 t)DtP t St ; f
g
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We nally have the feedback monetary and scal policy rules:
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Rttdt +Qtt+1 (1  t) dt
TT  1t yHt
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Rt

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
t +Q

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1
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TT 1 t yHt
(147)
Therefore, we have 27 equations for the home country, 21 equations for the foreign country
and 11 equations for the policy reules. This is 59 equations in total. We also have 59 endogenous
variables, which are fV; yH ; c, cH ; cF ; n; x; k; fh, m; TT; ; H ; ; ; w; mc; e!; rk; d, ;
z1; z2; Q; ; qg and fR; sg;  c; k; n; lg for the home country, and fV ; yH ; c, cH ; cF ;
n; x; k; fh, m; H ; ; ; w; mc; e!; rk; d; z1; z2; Q; Rg and fsg; c; k;
n; lg for the foreign country. This is given given the exogenous variables, f; ; sl; ; sl;
A; Ag, initial conditions for the state variables and the values of the feedback (monetary and
scal) policy coe¢ cients in the policy rules.
Notice that, since all market-clearing conditions have been already included, the above
system also satises the international asset market-clearing condition, (fg   fh)+ StP tPt (fg  
fh) = 0. This can be seen if we add up the two balance of payments above; this will give
(fg   fh) + StP tPt (fg   fh) = 0 residually.
5.4 Steady state and transition in a monetary union
The steady state system follows directly from the above dened system when variables do
not change over time. At steady state, regarding monetary policy, we set  =  = 1 and
let the nominal interest rates to follow residually from the Euler for bonds in each country.
Regarding scal policy, the residual policy instrument is total public debt in each country. To
get the transition path, we approximate the dynamic system around its steady state solution,
as explained in the main text. In this regime, transition dynamics are driven by shocks.
6 Appendix 6: Flexible exchange rates
The equilibrium system with exible exchange rates is the same as that with a currency union
except that  and R exchange places, which means that now  becomes endogenous while R
follows a Taylor-type rule as R does. To get the steady state system and the transition path,
we work as said above. Since money is neutral in the steady state, the steady state solution is
the same as in the currency union regime (at least for real variables and welfare).
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7 Appendix 7: Monetary plus scal (transfer) union
This Appendix presents some details on the scal (transfer) union regime. As said, we distin-
guish two types of interregional transfers.
7.1 Transfers as insurance
The benchmark is the currency union system. In the case of transfers as insurance, the balance
of payments in Germany changes to:
(1  t)dt   TT + 1t fht + t + TT  1t qt =  TT  1t cFt + TT t cFt +
+
Qt 1TT 
+ 1
t
t

1
TT v+v
 1
t 1
(1  t 1)dt 1   fht 1

+ 
 
yH   yHt
 P Ht
P t
    yH   yHt  PHtPt
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and the balance of payments in Italy changes to:
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To get the steady state system and the transition path, we work as said above. Since shocks
and hence insurance transfers are temporary, the steady state solution remains the same as in
the currency union regime.
7.2 Transfers as redistribution
Again, the benchmark is the currency union system. In the case of transfers as redistribution,
the balance of payments in Germany changes to:
(1  t)dt   TT + 1t fht + t + TT  1t qt =  TT  1t cFt + TT t cFt +
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and the balance of payments in Italy changes to:
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If, in addition, we have moral hazard e¤ects, the Euler equation for capital and the labor
supply condition in the receiving country change to:
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
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To get the steady state system and the transition path, we work as said above. Since
redistributive transfers are systematic, the steady state solution di¤ers from that of a currency
union. Numerical steady state solutions with redistributive transfers (without, and with, moral
hazard) are reported right below in the next subsection.
22
7.3 Steady state solutions with transfers as redistribution
Table A1: Steady state solution with transfers as redistribution
without moral hazard e¤ects
Variables Description Home Foreign
u; u
steady-state
utility
0.0326 0.0366
yH ; yH output 0.392064 0.353538
c; c consumption 0.230406 0.22882
n; n hours worked 0.312246 0.305637
k; k capital 0.666854 0.496561
w; w real wage rate 0.696103 0.709986
rk; rk
real return to
physical capital
0.146983 0.177993
Q  Q interest rate premium - 0.0055
c
yHTT 1  ;
c
yHTT 
 1
t
consumption
as share of GDP
0.5585 0.6810
k
yH
; k

yH
physical capital
as share of GDP
1.7009 1.4045
TT 

t
fht
yHt
; 1TT t
fht
yHt
private foreign assets
as share of GDP
0.2442 0.2190
d
TT  1yH ;
d
TT 1 yH
total public debt
as share of GDP
0.6609 1.1075
TT 

t

(1 )d
TT+
 1 fh

yH
;
(1 )d
TT1    f
h
TT t y
H
total foreign debt
as share of GDP
0.211749 -0.0592009
Notes: see Tables 1a-c for parameter values and exogenous policy instruments.
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Table A2: Steady state solution with transfers as redistribution
with moral hazard e¤ects
Variables Description Home Foreign
u; u
steady-state
utility
-0.0169 0.0159
yH ; yH output 0.392997 0.316356
c; c consumption 0.219549 0.220082
n; n hours worked 0.312989 0.285588
k; k capital 0.66844 0.401661
w; w real wage rate 0.664878 0.711848
rk; rk
real return to
physical capital
0.146983 0.196905
Q  Q interest rate premium - 0.0055
c
yHTT 1  ;
c
yHTT 
 1
t
consumption
as share of GDP
0.5071 0.7664
k
yH
; k

yH
physical capital
as share of GDP
1.7009 1.2696
TT 

t
fht
yHt
; 1TT t
fht
yHt
private foreign assets
as share of GDP
0.0906 0.2438
d
TT  1yH ;
d
TT 1 yH
total public debt
as share of GDP
0.6275 1.2355
TT 

t

(1 )d
TT+
 1 fh

yH
;
(1 )d
TT1    f
h
TT t y
H
total foreign debt
as share of GDP
0.0850653 0.236636
Notes: see Tables 1a-c for parameter values and exogenous policy instruments.
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7.4 Transfers as redistribution (sensitivity analysis)
Here we report results when  rises to  = 0:1. This implies that transfers from Germany to
Italy, as share of Italian GDP, are equal to 0.2%.
Table A3: Expected discounted lifetime utility (welfare) under di¤erent regimes (=0.1)
Regimes Welfare
Germany Italy Union-wide
Monetary union 2.2554 1.4317 1.8439
Independent mon. policies 2.2554 1.4318 1.8439
Mon. union plus transfers as insurance 2.2676 1.4328 1.8505
Mon. union plus transfers as redistribution 1.9704 2.1012 2.0357
Mon. union plus transfers as
redistribution (with moral hazard)
-4.4050 1.2640 -1.5727
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